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young men and women in Spain. More particularly, we use matched EPA files for the period 
1987-1996 to analyse re-employment probabilities among workers aged 16-29 who posses work 
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factors that affect the probability of leaving unemployment for becoming either employed or 
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1. Introduction 
In the second quarter of 1995, 41.8 per cent of workers aged 16-24 were unemployed in 
Spain. This figure compares to an unemployment rate of 19.9 per cent for people with 25-54 years 
of age. Despite declining labour force participation rates, Spanish youth unemployment appears 
extremely high, even by European standards. 1 Improving the youth labour market continues to pose 
a challenge to l~bour market policies in many countries (OECD (1992». Because of having the 
highest overall unemployment rate in the OECD area, Spanish young workers face comparatively 
harder conditions to integrate themselves in the world of work. 
From the extensive literature that has studied the youth labour market, we know that the latter 
has specific features which contribute to explain the relatively poorer employment performance of 
young workers (Wachter and Kim (1984), Rees (1986), Lynch (1989), Topel and Ward (1992), 
Narendranathan and Elias (1993». For instance, that many youths share participation in the labour 
force with school attendance; that young workers change labour force status much more frequently 
than adults; that many young persons live with their parents, which means that they tend to be less 
pressed to find work and to remain in the labour force; and, that early work experience has a 
significant impact on future career developments. 
In previous work, Alba-Ramírez (1996a) finds that a key issue to study youth unemployment 
is the success in finding the first jobo Having contact with the labour market for the first time, after 
school, young people must overcome the natural obstacle of lacking experience. In a context of high 
unemployment (see Appendix 1), first job seekers are obliged to compete for employment with 
experienced workers. The latter have an advantage in finding work because they know better how to 
search for a job, Le., using already created networks; and also because employers tend to have ataste 
1 In 1991, when the Spanish labour market was at its best, the youth employment rate in Spain 
was 30.5 per cent, and in the European Cornmunity the corresponding figure was 17.6 per cent. 
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for workers with work experience. Thus, the employment performance of new entrants to the labour 
market is usually worse than that of workers who have worked before.2 
In this article, we focus on the labour market performance of experienced young workers. In 
particular, we study the transition from unemployment to employment and to inactivity of men and 
women aged 16-29 who have already acquired sorne work experience. By imposing additional 
restrictions on the sample used, we are able to concentrate on a group of young workers who are 
highly attached to the labour market.3 This also warranties lower heterogeneity in the group ofyoung 
job seekers whose labour force transitions we study. We apply a discrete-time duration model, and 
use matched files from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA). 
In the following section, we present a discrete hazard model under competing risks. In section 
3 we describe the data and indicate the criteria for sample selection. In section 4 we estimate the 
model and give results on labour force transitions of experienced young workers. Finally, in section 
5, we surnmarize the results and conclude. Appendix 1 contains sorne relevant features of labour 
market policies and institutions, and an overview of youth unemployment over the last two decades 
in Spain. 
2. A Discrete Hazard Model for Labour Force Transitions 
As described in the next section, we can study transitions from unemployment by using quarterly 
matched files from EPA. Because in this date set we are able to follow individuals for a maximum 
2 Alba-Ramírez (1996a) finds that the exit rates from unemployment is about twice as high among 
experienced young workers than among first job seekers. For instance, 9.3 per cent of teenagers 
looking for thefirst job in the second quarter of 1995 were reported employed three months later; 
the equivalent transition rate was 23.7 per cent for teenagers who had sorne work experience. For 
persons aged 20-29 the differences in transitions probabilities were also quite important. 
3 Lynch (1989) adopts a similar strategy in her study of unemployment duration among U.S. 
young men and women. 
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of six quarters, it is possible to apply a discrete-time duration model. In a discrete-time model, an 
individual's unemployment spell is represented by a random variable, T, which can take on positive 
integer values only. We observe a total of n independent individuals (i = 1, ... ,n) beginning a sorne 
natural starting point t = 1. In the data described in the previous section, such point is the quarter 
when the worker becomes unemployed. Each observation continues until time t¡, at which point an 
event occurs or the observation is censored. The unemployment spell can end, T = t, in any of j 
states: j = 1 (employment) or j = 2 (inactivity). The observation is censored when the surviving 
individual is observed at quarter t¡ but not at quarter t¡ + 1. It is assumed that the time of censoring 
is independent of the hazard rate for the occurrence of events, at least after controlling for other 
factors. AIso, it is assumed that the set of two states at which unemployment spells can end is 
absorbing and equal for each persono 
Por modelling the transition from unemployment to employment or to inactivity, we define 
the di serete transition rateo Por the i-th person the transition rate into state j G = 1,2) in interval t, 
A¡j(t¡), is the conditional probability of a transition to state j in this interval, given that individual i has 
been unemployed until t. 4 
where x¡(t¡} is a vector of covariates for individual i, sorne of which can be time-variant. Assuming 
that the competing risks are independent, the hazard rate from unemployment is given by 
2 
(2) h¡(t¡I.)=E Aij(tJ) 
j=l 
4 According to the simple job search model (Lippman and Maceall (1976», given a stationary 
reservation wage, the re-employment probability is the results of two probabilities, the rate at which 
offers arrive times the probability that a random offer is accepted. In our competing risk model, 
unemployed workers can either obtain a job or leave the labour force. 
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The conditional probability of remaining unemployed in period t is given by 
And not conditioning on the individual' s previous unemployment history, the survivor function up 
to period t is 
t-l 
(4) Pr[T¡~tJ]=S(tJ)=rr (l-h¡('tl.)) 
T=l 
Then, the transition into state j in period t can be expressed in terms of the respective transition rate 
and the survivor function as 
t-l 
(5) Pr[T¡=t¡, J =j l.] = Aij(tJ) rr (l-h¡( 't l·)) 
T=l 
To derive the likelihood function for this model, we need to define the following indicator function: 
Oij = 1, if individual i makes a transition to state j 
= O, otherwise 
Assuming independence of all observations, the sample likelihood function is given by 
n 2 
(6) ;g = rr rr [Pr(T¡=t¡, J=jl.)t;j [Pr(T¡>tJ)]Hi;j 
¡=1 j=1 
In terms of the transition and hazard rates, we can write 
n 2 t-l 
(7) ;g = rr rr [Aij(t¡ Ix¡(t¡))t;j [rr (l-h( 't Ix¡( 't)))] 
¡=l j=1 T=1 
Now we just need to specify the transition rates and derive the corresponding survivor function. Then, 
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we can plug both expressions into the likelihood function in order to estimate the coefficients. Por 
the transition rate we chose the logistic specification that, with multiple events, generates the 
multinomial logit model (Maddala (1983». It allows for the three possible labour force states 
considered: employment, inactivity, and unemployment, which is the base category. 
(8) 
Por individual i, the transition rate to state j in period t is given by 
I 
exp( «p¡) + Pjz¡(t¡» 
A¡/t¡!ap¡),z¡(t¡» = --2--=-----'----
1+¿ exp(a/t¡)+p;z;Ct¡» 
j=1 
and the survivor function is 
(9) 
t-l 1 
S(tl)=II ------
t=1 2 
1 + ~ exp(a .(t.) +P~z.(t.» L...; JJ JIJ 
j=l 
where aj(t¡) is a vector of durnmies variables for each period (quarter) workers remain unemployed, 
z¡(t¡) is a vector of explanatory variables which may vary with time, {jj is the vector of parameters to 
be estimated, and by definition, x¡{t¡} = [aj(t¡},z¡(t¡)]. Note that aj(t¡), known as the baseline hazard, 
describes in a flexible way the time dependency of the transition process. We specify it by quarter 
durnmies which coefficients for transitions to employment can differ from those for transitions to 
inactivity. 
In the discrete hazard model described aboye, each discrete time unit for each individual is 
treated as a separate observation or unit of analysis. Poer the data set used in this artic1e, which is 
described in the next section, the dependent variable or unit of analysis is the individual's quarter of 
unemployment. It takes the value of 1 if a certain event occurred to that worker in that time unit, and 
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zero otherwise. As workers are interviewed every three-month intervals, the event that takes place 
is observing a transition either to employment or to inactivity. 
It can be shown that the likelihood function for the discrete-time model as expressed by 
equation (7) is equivalent to a multinomial logit model where, assuming independence between the 
three states, all !ndividual observed time units are pooled (Allison (1982». As A1lison points out, it 
is important to realize that, " ... unlike the likelihood function for the continuous-time model, the 
discrete-time likelihood cannot be factored into separate components for each of the m kinds of 
events. Hence ML [maximum likelihood] estimation must be done simultaneously for all kind of 
events." (p. 88).5 Accepting the model specification, the estimates for O!j and (3j posses the standard 
properties of the maximum likelihood estimations. 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
The Labour Force Survey (EPA) has been used for figures in the Appendix. The same data is used 
for analysing labour marker transitions of young workers. This is possible by taking advantage of the 
panel structure of the EPA, in which a sixth of the sample (sorne 60,000 households) rotates every 
quarter. This allows to follow a person for a maximum of six quarters. With sorne restrictions, EPA 
files suitable for studying labour market transitions have just recentIy been made available by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). Place of residence, and the code to identify members 
ofthe same household have been dropped from the matched files. Age is available as grouped in five-
year brackets. 
5 It should also be pointed out that when there are many kinds of risks or events it becomes 
cumbersome to specify each type of them in order to apply the multinomial methodology. In this case, 
a simpler alternative analogous to that of the continuous time method, consists of treating as censored 
those spells which end in states different from the one under consideration. The binomial model can 
then be used. However, unlike the multinomial logit estimator, in this case the binomial estimator is 
not fully efficient. See Allison (1982), p. 90 and references there in. AIso, see Narendranathan and 
Stewart (1993) and Jenkins (1995) for expositions of the binomial model. 
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The time period available expands from the second quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 
1996. This period inc1udes part of the phase of strong employment growth that lasted until the early 
1990's, the deep employment crisis of 1992 and 1993, and the recovery since 1994. Therefore, the 
data permit to analyse transitions over a complete cyc1e of the Spanish economy. We do this by 
pooling aH individuals whose labour force state we observe for at least two consecutive quarters 
beginning at the first interview. Restricting the sample to youth aged 16-29, Table 1 shows the result 
of the attempt to match individual observations from the second quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter 
of 1996. Conditioning on being in the household at the first interview, we obtain a sample of22,706 
unemployed men and 25,426 unemployed women, aged 16-29. 
As indicated in Table 1, in selecting the sample for this artic1e we first consider all 
unemployed persons whose labour force state is observed at the first and one or more posterior 
adjacent quarters. About 65 percent of individuals were observed for the six consecutive quarters -
maximum length of permanence in the sample of a rotating panel. Spells that follow a missing 
quarter, even though they may be adjacent, are ignored. For instance, and individuals who is in the 
survey at the first and the second quarter, is missing in the third, and re-appear in the fourth, fifth 
and sixth quarters is only considered for labour force transition between the first and the second 
quarter. If he or she remains unemployed in the second quarter, the observation will be censored. 
Note in Table 1 that there are 549 men and 656 women that fit such pattern. After applying this 
selection criteria, we obtain a sample of 20,418 men and 22,693 women. 
The next step in sample selection consists of retaining those unemployed persons who 
indicated to have worked before, resulting a sample of 24,536 observations. Of these, we consider 
only those who, when first interviewed, reported to have lost or left the previous job 3 or fewer 
months ago -7,660 observations. Because we wish to analyse a sample of unemployed youths who 
are highly attached to the labour force, we exc1ude 322 women and 418 men because they indicated 
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to be attending school when first interviewed. Moreover, we use a question on the person's activity 
before starting job search in order to retain in the sample only those who reported to be working, 95 
and 92 percent of men and women, respectively. By deleting observation for which relevant variables 
are missing, we end up with a sample of 4,055 men and 2,419 women, which generate 9,208 and 
6,125 quarterly spells (time units) ofunemployment for men and women, respectively. Ofthe 4,055 
men in the sample, we observe a complete spell for 3,061 -2,656 become re-employed and 405 
inactive. Qfthe 2,419 women in the sample, 1,611 completed their spell by finding ajob (1,249) or 
leaving the labour force (362). 
4. Estimation and Results 
In order to estímate the discrete-tíme hazard model described in section 2, subject to the available 
information indicated in the previous section, we consider the following groups of explanatory 
variables:6 
(i) Demographic variables. Durnmies for three age groups, four educational levels, and 
marital status. 
(ii) Previousjob characteristics. Dummies for type ofprevious employment (wage and salary 
job in the private or the public sector, or self-employment); five dummies for duration ofthe previous 
job; three durnmies for reasons for loosing or leaving the previous job; and five sectoral durnmies. 
(iii) Variables related to job search. Dummies for the worker's situation at the public 
employment office (registered receiving benefits, registered without benefits, and not registered); four 
dummies for willingness to accept a job that implies: change of residence, a different activity than 
in the previous job, lower wage, or less qualified occupation; three dummies fOl" type of job searched 
6 As indicated earlier, these variables are deemed to pick up the effect of personal and other 
characteristics on the probability of receiving a job offer and the probability that the offer is 
acceptable; and, also, on the probability of leaving the labour force. Unfortunately, we lack 
information on the individual's region of residence and household composition to control for local 
labour market conditions and family structure. 
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(full-time only, full-time but part-time would be acceptable, and other possibilities). 
(iv) Calendar time dummies. Four seasonal dummies indicating the quarter in which the 
worker became unemployed, and year dummies for the year in which that event took place. The latter 
are intended to control for the business cycle and other factors that changed over the period of study. 
(v) Aggregate variable. As an alternative to year dummies, we use the quarterly rate of 
change of the gross domestic product (GDP) from the second quarter of 1987 to the sixth quarter of 
196. This is indented to pick up the effect of the business cycle on labour market transitions. 
(vi) Unemployment duration dummies. Three durnmies to control for the number of months 
unemployed at the time of the first interview (one, two, or three months); and five quarterly 
dummies, one for each quarter the worker remains unemployed after becoming so during the three 
months preceding the first interview. 
Given the properties ofthe di serete-time duration model described in section 3 (Allison 1982), 
together with the discrete nature of the data, we estimat~ a multinomial logit model on pooled 
individual time-unit observations. Unemployed workers in the initial quarter can become either 
employed or inactive in any of the subsequent quarters.7 We follow Flinn and Heckman (1983) to 
make sense of this distinction, contrary to what is claimed by Clark and Surnmers (1982), for 
example. The former rejects the hypothesis that unemployment and out of the labour force are 
behaviorally meaningless distinctions. In this article, distinguishing between transitions to employment 
or transitions to inactivity along the unemployment spell is particularly useful for taking into account 
that sorne young workers may stop searching to return to school or become inactive as a consequence 
of conscription. AIso, a transition from unemployment to out of the labour force can occur if the 
7 A shortcoming of observing labour force states in one-quarter intervals is that we certainly miss 
sorne of the very short employment or inactivity spells. 
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person falls discouraged in looking for work.8 
Before discussing the estimation results, it is useful to look at the empirical hazard rates from 
unemployment to employment or to inactivity. The hazard (or transition) rate from state i to state j 
is defined as the proportion of persons who enter state j in time t + 1 given that they had remained in 
state i until tiII!e t. Because we know an individual's labour force state for a maximum of six 
consecutive quarters, we can calculate hazard rates over five quarterly periods. 
Table 2 presents the Kaplan-Meier estimates or empirical hazard rates from unemployment 
to employment and from unemployment to inactivity -averaged for the period 1987-1996- for men 
and women. It is clear that men are more likely to become employed and less likely to leave the 
labour force than women. From the first to the second quarter, about 33 percent of men and 22 
percent of women become employed, and 4.6 percent of men and 7.3 percent of women become 
inactive. As time passes, the probability of leaving unemployment diminishes for both sexes, 
particularly since the fourth quarter. On the other hand, the hazard rates from unemployment to 
inactivity do not change much over the unemployment spell. 
Negative duration dependence is cornmon in unemployment duration studies. Usually, this 
phenomenon persists after controlling for observed heterogeneity. Experience tells us that by 
introducing unobserved heterogeneity in the model its estimation becomes more complicated without 
adding much to the main results.9 In this paper we have opted for keeping the statistical model as 
8 Although it is hard to discriminate between the different reasons for becoming inactive, an 
advantage of the competing risk model is that we can obtain a neater result for the re-employment 
probability because we estimate the discrete-time hazard model simultaneously for the two kinds of 
exits from unemployment. 
9 Bover et al. (1997) estimate a discrete-time duration model with unobserved heterogeneity on 
a data set that, as the one used in this paper, was obtained from matched EPA files. When taking into 
account unobserved heterogeneity, their model does not produce significantIy different results from 
those obtained with a general hazard model. In fact, as Meyer (1990) shows, this is likely to happen 
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simple as possible; and, at the same time, we try to reduce heterogeneity by considering a sample of 
youths deemed to be highly attached to the labour market. Tables 3 and 4 contain the proportions for 
each variable and the estimated coefficients with their asymptotic t-statistics in absolute values. In 
what follows, we first indicate the resulting relationship between explanatory variables and the 
probability of making a transition to either employment or inactivity. Then we focus on the predicted 
hazards rates for workers with specific characteristics. 
4.1. Individual and Other Characteristics 
Age has quite different effects on transitions by gender. Men aged 16-19 exhibit a lower probability 
ofre-employment and higher probability ofbecoming inactive. On the other hand, women aged 25-29 
are less likely to become employed, and age has no effect on transitions to inactivity. Secondary 
vocational and university education have strong effects on the probability of obtaining a job among 
women. However, the dummy for university education obtains a negative and slight1y significant 
coefficient for men's transition to employment. Married men and married women are, respectively, 
more and less likely to become employed. AIso, married women exhibit a strong probability of 
leaving unemployment to become inactive. 
As for the impact of previous job characteristics on the transition rates, sorne results are 
worthy to mention. Among men, the re-employment probability is higher for workers whose previous 
job tenure was 3-11 months. For both, men and women longer tenure at the previous job means 
longer unemployment duration. To interpret this results one should take into account that longer 
duration of the previous job entails more specific human capital, and also make workers more likely 
to be eligible for unemployment compensation. Note that more than 70 percent of unemployed youth 
stayed in their previous job for less than one year, which is an indication of very high turnover among 
when the hazard rate is allowed to be nonparametric, which is the case with the Cox proportional 
hazard model and the discrete-time duration model. 
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our sample ofunemployed youths. On the other hand, men who previously worked in "other services" 
are found to be les s likely to find work. 
Variables deemed to be related to job search provide sorne interesting results. Both, men and 
women, not registered at the public employment office are more likely to find work and also to 
become inactive. However, being registered and receiving benefits does not obtain a significant 
coefficient in the multinornial regressions. The three durnrnies that indicate the situation with respect 
to the public employment office, as quarter1y reported, are allowed to vary over the unemployment 
spell. 1O The dummy equals to one if the worker is willing a accept a job that implies a lower than 
expected wage, given his or her qualifications, obtains a positive and significant coefficient for men 
and an insignificant coefficient for women. This could be interpreted as a more flexible reservation 
wage among unemployed meno AIso remarkable is the result that workers who indicate to be 
searching for a full-time job only (15.5 percent of men and 12.7 percent of women) show a higher 
probability of finding work. The coefficient is highly significant for men and slight1y significant for 
women. The dummy that equals one if the worker is looking for a full-time job but he or she would 
be ready to accept a part-time job is also associated with a higher probability of re-employment among 
male job seekers. 
Regarding calendar time variables, becoming unemployed in the fourth quarter reduces 
significantly the probability of employment among men and increases significantly the probability of 
inactivity among women. Year dummy variables, aimed at picking up the cyclical effect on transition 
rates, show sorne differences by gender. Compared to 1987, the transition to employment declined 
10 By exarnining quarter1y data on the worker's relation with the public employment office, we 
found quite bizarre patterns. Many changes in benefit receipt throughout the unemployment spell seem 
difficult to explain. Thus, instead of making any hard-to-justify adjustment, we decided to use the row 
data on the worker's status at the employment office. Alba-Ramírez (1996b) indicates sorne caveats 
in using matched EPA files to study the effect of unemployment compensation on unemployment 
duration. 
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significantIy for men who became unemployed in 1992 or after, and for women who became 
unemployed in 1990 or after. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 1, where the predicted 
transition rates to either state are depicted for the reference worker defined below. The figure shows 
that transition to employment reached a minimum in 1992 for men and in 1993 for women. On the 
other hand, the transition to inactivity is increasing over the period among men and more stable 
among women, except for the strong increase in the probability of leaving the labour force in 1991 
and 1992. 
4.2. Predicted Hazard Rates 
Tables 5 and 6 present the predicted hazard rates decomposed into transitions to employment and 
transitions to inactivity for men and women, respectively. The first row of each table and panel 
contains quarterly hazard rates of the reference group, and the remaining rows refer to predicted 
hazards calculated for workers with specific characteristics, keeping other explanatory variables 
constant. The difference between hazards of the reference group and that resulting from changing a 
specific covariate indicates the latter's marginal effect on the probability of making a transition at a 
given quarter of the unemployment spell. 
For the reference group,l1 the probability of becoming employed during the second quarter 
after entering unemployment (a spell duration of 3 to 6 months) is 42 percent among men and 38 
percent among women. On the other hand, the probability of leaving the labour force in such quarter 
11 The characteristics of the reference group are: Aged 20-24, academic secondary education, not 
married, lost a temporary job, employed for 3-5 months in a previous public-sector job, the job was 
in manufacturing, registered without benefits, not willing to move to another area, not willing to 
accept a change in activity, not willing to accept a lower than expected wage, not willing to accept 
a lower occupation, looking for any job regardless of work-time, and became unemployed in the first 
quarter of 1987. As the sample is composed of new entrants to unemployment -when first interviewed 
the person has been unemployed for 3 or fewer months- in order to calculate predicted hazards the 
reference worker is set to have an initial unemployment duration equal to that of the average worker 
in the sample. This is reasonable because we compute quarterly hazards in order to be consistent with 
the nature of the data. 
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is 2 and 3 percent for men and women respectively. For those who remain unemployed when 
observed at the second quarter, the probability of re-employment declines significantly for men (by 
10 percent), and stays constant for women. From the third to the fourth quarter the transition rate to 
employment increases a one percentage point among men, and decreases by a one percentage point 
among women. Thereafter, Tables 5 and 6 show that the re-employment probability strongly declines 
for both men and women. Whereas 38 percent of unemployed men become employed from the third 
to the fourth quarter of the unemployment spell, three months later the re-employment probability is 
26 percent, which represents a decline of 37 percent. For women, the corresponding decline in the 
re-employment probability is 16 percent, from 37 to 31 percent. From the fifth to the sixth quarter -
the maximum period for which we can follow unemployed people- the decline in the re-employment 
probability is 12 percent for men, and 29 percent for women. 
The effects of characteristics on the hazard rate have been indicated in the previous sub-
section. Tables 5 and 6 contain the predicted hazards for sorne specific characteristics which obtained 
significant coefficients in the estimated multinomial models. For women aged 16-19 the hazard to 
employment is not significantly different from that for 20-24 year old women. However, among men 
teenagers exhibit a lower probability of becoming employed. University education strongly increases 
the hazard to employment among women but reduces it for meno One possible explanation for this 
result could be related to a high reservation wage among men with university education. 12 
Being married increases the hazard to employment among men, and decreases the hazard to 
employment among women. At the beginning of the unemployment spell, the referred increase for 
men is 15 percent and the decrease for women is 22 percent. However, married women are more 
likely to leave the labour force than unmarried women. Because we lack other control s for women's 
12 For men aged 20-64, Bover el al. (1997) find a relatively weak effect of education on the 
probability of leaving unemployment. For university education, they find a decreasing effect over the 
unemployment spell. 
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farnily responsibilities, the dummy for being married is likely to pick up the probable existence of 
children and the constrains they impose on female labour force participation. Without information on 
household composition we are unable to control for factors that affect the labour force decisions of 
married women, as for instance spouse's labour market status. 
As indicated earlier, variables related to job search produce interesting results. We do not 
obtain that registered unemployed youth receiving unemployment insurance benefits exhibit a lower 
probability of re-employment. 13 As explained, this could be caused by measurement error in the 
variable that indicates the individual's situation at the public employment officeY However, it is 
clear that unemployed young persons who are not registered (6.5 of men and 7.3 percent of women 
in the sample) are significantly more likely to become employed and, at the same time, more likely 
to leave the labour force than those registered. This result, that holds for both men and women, 
suggests that there may be two types of non-registered workers: more employable and less attached 
to the labour force, two attributes that are hard to separate from these workers' ineligibility for 
unemployment benefits. 
Men willing to accept a job that pays a lower than expected wage are about 9 percent more 
likely to become employed when observed the second time after entering unemployment. The 
marginal probability keeps roughly constant over the unemployment spel1. This results is consistent 
13 For a sample of U.S. youths, Lynch (1989) finds that various measures for benefit receipt do 
not appear to significantIy affect their re-employment probability. 
14 Bover et al. (1997) use a measure for benefit receipt that differs from the quarter1y row data 
in order to correct for delay in receipt of benefits attributable to the administrative process for 
entitlement. They establish that unemployed workers without benefits when first interviewed and 
reported receiving benefits when subsequentIy interviewed are considered to be benefit recipients from 
the beginning of the unemployment spell to the last quarter in which the worker declares to be 
receiving benefits. As indicated by Alba-Ramirez (1996b), this may cause a bias in the estimated 
effect ofbenefit receipt on re-employment probabilities. Another reason for not adopting such strategy 
in this paper is that, for youth, we have observed erratic changes in benefit status throughout the 
unemployment spell. 
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with a job search model where workers who are willing to reduce their reservations wage should 
leave unemployment earlier (Burdett and Vishwanath (1988». 
Of the characteristics inc1uded in the multinomial regression, that of searching for a full-time 
job only (14.5 percent of men and 13 percent of women) has the strongest impact on the re-
employment propability among meno As compared with the reference group, the corresponding hazard 
is 21 percent higher at the beginning of the unemployment spell, and about 29 percent higher when 
survivor workers are observed six quarters later. The dummy also obtains a positive and significant 
coefficient for women. Men who are looking for a full-time job but would be willing to accept a part-
time job (30 percent of the sample) are also more likely to find work. This result may indicate that 
workers who would only accept a full-time job search more intensively, have higher income needs, 
or simply are more confident about their job prospects. 
4.3. The Effect of the Business Cycle 
As the data used correspond to a period in which the Spanish economy experienced high GDP 
growth, entered in a deep recession, and slowly recovered, we are able to study how this economic 
cyc1e affected the transitions out of unemployment of young workers. In principIe, one may think that 
downturns reduce the re-employment probability as firms stop hiring and lay off workers. On the 
other hand, the recovery brings more job offers. However, workers are more likely to accept job 
offers when they are harder to come by, and the opposite is true when the situation of the labour 
market improves. With regard to the transition out ofthe labour force, one can expect that it increases 
as a result of discouragement in sluggish labour markets, whereas economic recovery makes job 
search more successful. 
As indicated earlier, a first manner of taking into account the effect of the business cycle on 
the transitions from unemployment is by using year dummies. In this respect, the last two rows of 
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Tables 5 and 6 (Figure 1) document the fact that 1992 is a through in the business cyc1e, and that by 
1995 the re-employment probabilities for the reference group were still well below those for 1987, 
particularly among men (see Figure Al). This is also reflected in the latter's higher probability of 
leaving the labour force. As labour market conditions deteriorate, unemployed youth face harder re-
employment probabilities and become more prone to stop actively looking for ajobo Note, however, 
that this "discourage effect" is less apparent for women than for men, after controlling for observed 
heterogeneity . 
Although, year dummies are very useful to show the timing ofbusiness cycle effects on labour market 
transitions, there is the problem that other factors associated with calendar time cannot be separated 
from the genuine business cyc1e effect. For this reason, we use an alternative manner of picking up 
such an effect which consists of replacing year dummies with the GDP rate of change, measured at 
every quarter over the same quarter of the previous year. It is important to realize that the indicated 
variable is allowed to vary over each individual's unemployment spel1. The use of GDP growth 
instead of year dummies is the only difference of the new specification compared with those presented 
in Tables 3 and 4. 15 Given that the coefficients for the other variables changed little in comparison 
with those reported in Tables 3 and 4, in Table 7 we only present results for GDP growth. 
The business cyc1e, as measured by GDP growth, has a strong effect on the re-employment 
probability of men and of women. An increase of 4 percentage points in GDP increases the hazard 
rate ofthe first quarter by 7.65 percentage points (24 percent) for men, and by 7.75 percentage points 
(31 percent) for women. The positive effect of GDP growth on the re-employment probability is 
15 Based on this new specification, we tried several durnmies to control for institutional changes 
occurred during the data periodo For instance, the reform of the unemployment compensation system 
carried out in April of 1992. Results did not show any significant dummy effect, except for a reduced 
probability of leaving the labor force among women since the second quarter of 1992. AIso, when 
we inc1uded an interaction term between GDP growth and unemployment duration, it was negative 
but insignificant for men and negative and slightly significant for women. 
17 
stronger among workers unemployed for longer time. At the fifth quarter ofunemployment, 4 points 
of increase in GD P increases the re-employment probability by 31 percent for men and by 38 percent 
for women. 
As regards the relationship between GDP growth and the transition to inactivity, Table 7 
indicates that th~re is no effect for men and a negative effect for women. Women's transition to out 
of the labour force declines by almost a third when the GDP increases by 4 percentage points. This 
results is not surprising because it is well known that women's labour force participation tends to be 
highly responsive to economic fluctuations and the state of the labour market. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This articles has addressed sorne dynamic aspects of the youth labour market in Spain. The focus has 
been on assessing the impact of a number of variables on the re-employment probability of 
experienced young men and women. We used matched EPA files in order to pool all possible rotating 
panels for the period that extends from the second quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 1996. By 
employing a discrete-time hazard model, within a competing risk framework, we were able to analyse 
transitions from unernployrnent to both ernployrnent and inactivity. In order to reduce heterogeneity 
in the sarnple of experienced young workers, we irnposed sorne restrictions for warranting high labour 
rnarket attachrnent. 
Arnong the main results we should ernphasize the following: (1) Wornen with university 
education exhibit a significantly higher re-ernployrnent probability, whereas university education is 
associated with a significantly lower re-ernployrnent probability arnong men; (2) contrary to the result 
for wornen, marriage increases the re-employment probability among men; (3) men who are willing 
to accept a job that entails a lower than expected wage show a higher probability of finding work; (4) 
rnen and wornen who indicate to be looking for a full-tirne job exhibit a higher probability of re-
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employment, which is particularly stronger among men; (5) predicted hazard rates show duration 
dependence for men from the very beginning of the unemployment spell, whereas for women such 
duration dependence becomes apparent only for those who remain unemployed for more than three 
quarters; (6) Growing GDP improves the re-employment probability among men and women, but it 
reduces the probability of leaving the labour force only among young women. 
A shortcoming of this article is the impossibility to control for locallabour market conditions 
and family structure. The nature of the data used prevented us from doing so. However, the results 
presented in this paper shed sorne light on labour force transitions of experienced young workers in 
Spain, where youth unemployment is much higher than in other European countries. It would 
probably be too ambitious to derive public policy recornmendations from the results obtained in this 
article. For more confident policy implications, further work is needed to clarify the observed 
differences in the effects of formal education and of job search related variables on the re-employment 
probabilities. Along these same lines, improving the currently available matched EPA files to include 
relevant missing information will be helpful in future work. 
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Appendix 1. Youth Labour Market Policy and Performance 
As a background for the analysis undertaken in this paper, we present relevant features of labour 
market policy and performance of young workers. In this Appendix we do not distinguish between 
those who possess and do not possess previous work experience. It is important to take into account 
that specific policy measures tend to be targeted at youth in general. The aim of devoting part of this 
Appendix to yO':!th labour market policies is just to provide a glimpse of the institutional framework, 
rather than to as ses s how effective policy measures have been in helping youth to find work. 
1. Youth Labour Market Policy: Training and Apprenticeship Contracts 
A major policy event in recent history of the Spanish labour market is the regulation of fixed-term 
employment contracts enacted in October of 1984. The Government's objective was to promote 
employment by providing a legal instrument for circumventing firing restrictions on permanent 
workers: Fixed-term contracts allow firms to hire workers whose employment relation can be 
terminated at a certain date with a severance payment much lower than that for permanent workers. 
Up to 1996, successive labour market reforms did not alter the nature of the distinction between 
temporary and permanent employment in the labour legislation. 16 
As far as youths are concerned, the 1984 decree regulated two specific types of fixed-term 
contracts: the apprenticeship contract ("contrato para la formación") and the training contract 
("contrato en prácticas"). The apprenticeship contract was designed for 16-20 years old workers who 
lacked formal qualifications. This contract holders were supposed to complement work with training. 
The time devoted to the latter activity was not remunerated, and could range from one fourth to one 
half of total time stipulated in the contract. 
16 A more recent labour market reform, in 1997, created a new type of indefinite contract with 
lower severance pay for certain groups ofunemployed workers. We just mention this reform, but do 
not go into more details because it lies outside the time framework of our study. 
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The training contract was thought of for young workers with a formal qualification that could 
be applied at the work place. This contract could only be given to young people within the first four 
years following graduation from an academic or vocational institution. In 1988, a new regulation of 
the training contract gave employers special incentives to hire graduates from vocational schools 
registered as unemployment for two o more years and first job seekers also registered for two o more 
years. 
The duration of training and apprenticeship contracts could be of 3 months to 3 years. Firms 
hiring workers under these types of contracts were given fiscal incentives and subsidies: In particular, 
reductions of employers' contribution to the Social Security of 75 to 100 per cent; as well as subsidies 
depending on targeted groups, contract duration, and firm size. 
Recent labour market reforms have substantially modified the regulation of apprenticeship and 
training contracts. The reductions in Social Security contributions were suppressed in April of 1992 
for both types of contracts, and other fiscal incentives were linked to net employment creation and 
the conversion of temporary workers into permanent status. The apprenticeship contract was finally 
abolished in December of 1993, and in its place the government created the so called "contrato de 
aprendizaje", a legal figure that already existed in other European countries. 
The new apprenticeship contract ("contrato de aprendizaje") has features which are quite 
different from the "contrato de formación". Its duration is between 6 months and 3 years, and can 
be used for hiring workers aged 16-25 years. At least 15 per cent of working time must be devoted 
to training, and the wage cannot be lower than 70, 80 and 90 per cent of the minimum wage in the 
first, second and third year of the contract duration, respectively. Apprenticeship contract holders are 
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not entitled to unemployment benefit upon subsequent unemployment. 17 
2. Youth Labour Market Performance 
The upper panel of Figure Al shows that youth unemployment rate increased continuously from the 
mid-1970's to the mid-1980's, it declined thereafter and increased significantly in the most recent 
economic down~rn. A sluggish labour market gave way to the recovery in employment growth since 
1995. It is to be noted that the teenager unemployment rate has been more responsive to the business 
cycle than unemployment of20-24 year olds: both groups' unemployment rates get closer in upswings 
and distance in downturns. 
The lower panel of Figure Al presents the ratio s between youth and adult unemployment 
rates. We can observe a decline in the relative unemployment rate of youths, which is more 
pronounced for teenagers, particularly among women. In the most recent years, it can be detected a 
worsening ofthe relative employment performance of 16-19 year olds. This has to be assessed against 
the background of a diminishing supply of young workers, due to a declining trend in their share of 
total population, and in their labour force participation. For instance, the presence of teenagers in total 
labour force went from 7.7 per cent in 1985 to 4.1 per cent in 1995. 
Furthermore, because young workers stay longer in the educational system, they enter the 
labour force better equipped with formal education. This should have contributed to improve the 
youth labour market in general. However, the Spanish unemployment rate of young workers was 
roughly the same in 1995 than it was ten years earlier. This suggests that it has become harder for 
young people to find work in the 1990's than in the 1980's. 
17 The number of training and apprenticeship contracts signed since January 1985 increased until 
the end of the 1980s and leveled off just until the date in which subsidies and Social Security relief 
were eliminated. The new apprenticeship contract, however, has not been as successful as its 
predecessor. 
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Given that the present article focuses on experienced young workers, it will be useful to 
provide an indicator of their weight in total youth unemployment. Table Al contains the proportion 
of job seekers with work experience by three age groups, as well as the unemployment rate of each 
age group from 1987 to 1995. As reflected in the table, in 1987 young job seekers with experience 
counted for one fourth of unemployed teenagers, and one half of the unemployed aged 20-24 years. 
The proportion increased significantly up to 1993 and declined thereafter. For a given age group, the 
proportion of experienced young job seekers tends to be lower among women, with more marked 
gender differences for older groups. The cross tabulation of age and sex by years indicates that a 
higher proportion offirstjob seekers corresponds to higher unemployment rateo However, by looking 
at age-sex groups one can see that similar unemployment rates are associated with higher proportions 
of first job seekers in the 1980s than in the 1990s. 
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Table l. Distribution of Unemployed Workers Aged 16-29 According 
to the Sequence of Interviews 
Men Women 
Quarterly 
interviews Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
l ..... 1067 4.70 4.70 1282 5.04 5.04 
12 .... 774 3.41 8.11 977 3.84 8.88 
1.3 ... 76 0.33 8.44 75 0.29 9.18 
1..4 .. 34 0.15 8.59 35 0.14 9.32 
1. .. 5. 18 0.08 8.67- 20 0.08 9.40 
1. ... 6 32 0.14 8.81 34 0.13 9.53 
123 ... 648 2.85 11.67 874 3.44 12.97 
12.4 .. 61 0.27 11.94 80 0.31 13.28 
12 .. 5. 33 0.15 12.08 39 0.15 13.44 
12 ... 6 46 0.20 12.28 45 0.18 13.61 
1.34 .. 54 0.24 12.52 72 0.28 13.90 
1.3.5. 17 0.07 12.60 29 0.11 14.01 
1.3 .. 6 13 0.06 12.65 18 0.07 14.08 
1..45. 40 0.18 12.83 32 0.13 14.21 
1..4.6 22 0.10 12.93 16 0.06 14.27 
1. .. 56 43 0.19 13.12 51 0.20 14.47 
1234 .. 643 2.83 15.95 825 3.24 17.71 
123.5. 70 0.31 16.26 117 0.46 18.17 
123 .. 6 110 0.48 16.74 101 0.40 18.57 
12.45. 77 0.34 17.08 103 0.41 18.98 
12.3.6 40 0.18 17.26 71 0.28 19.26 
12 .. 56 123 0.54 17.80 116 0.46 19.71 
1. 345. 129 0.57 18.37 166 0.65 20.36 
1. 34.6 33 0.15 18.51 47 0.18 20.55 
1. 3.56 55 0.24 18.75 72 0.28 20.83 
1 .. 456 106 0.47 19.22 128 0.50 21.34 
12345. 958 4.22 23.44 1237 4.87 26.20 
1234.6 556 2.45 25.89 620 2.44 28.64 
123.56 574 2.53 28.42 643 2.53 31.17 
12.456 633 2.79 31.20 736 2.89 34.06 
1.3456 549 2.42 33.62 656 2.58 36.64 
123456 15072 66.38 100.00 16109 63.36 100.00 
-------------------------------------- ------------------------
Total 22706 100.00 25426 100.00 
Note: In the first column a dot indicates that the interview is 
missing. Numbers in bold are quarters (or spells) used to generate 
the sample for estimations. 
Source: Matched EPA files, second quarter of 1987 to fourth quarter 
of 1996. 
Table 2. Empirical Hazard Rates from Unemployrnent to Employrnent and to 
Inactivity. Pooled Sample of Workers 16-29 years of age 
Initial Sample: 
Follow-up 
Quarters 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Employrnent 
33.19 
28.50 
28.45 
18.77 
16.15 
Men 
4,055 
Inactivity 
4.61 
3.78 
5.25 
3.99 
3.87 
Women 
Employrnent Inactivity 
2,419 
22.28 
21. 79 
20.84 
16.59 
11.11 
7.31 
5.59 
5.23 
5.87 
5.45 
Note: The hazard rate is defined as the proportion of persons who change 
labour force satatus each quarter, after having remained unemployed up to 
that same quarter. 
Source: Matched EPA files, second quarter of 1987 to the fourth of 1995. 
Table 3. Determinants of Transitions from Unemployrnent to Employrnent and 
to Inactivity. Multinomial Logit Estimates and Asyrnptotic t-Statistics. 
Men 
Sample 
proportions 
Constant 
Aged 16-19 
Aged 20-24 
Aged 25-29 
Primary education or less 
Secondary (academic) 
Secondary (vocational) 
University 
Married 
Previous job characteristics 
Self-employrnent 
Wage/salary (Public) 
Wage/salary (Private) 
Tenure 0-2 months 
3-5 
6-11 
12-35 
36+ 
Lost a temporary job 
Layed-off 
Other 
Farming/fishing 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade/hotel 
Other services 
Job search related variables 
Receiving benefits 
Registered without benefits 
Not registered 
willing to change residency 
willing to change activity 
Willing to accept lower wage 
willing to accept lower category 
Look for full-time job only 
Part-time job acceptable 
Seasonal and yearly variables 
First quarter 
Second quarter 
Third quarter 
Fourth quarter 
Year 1987 
Year 1988 
Year 1989 
Year 1990 
Year 1991 
Year 1992 
Year 1993 
Year 1994 
Year 1995 
Unemployrnent duration dummies 
Unemployed 1 month or less 
Unemployed 2 months 
unemployed 3 months 
Quarter 1 
Quarter 2 
Quarter 3 
Quarter 4 
Quarter 5 
Proportion of cases 
Log likelihood 
Number of individuals 
Number of quarterly spells 
.1499 
.4591 
.3908 
.3523 
.4995 
.1227 
.0254 
.1695 . 
.0198 
.1095 
.8705 
.3226 
.1911 
.2139 
.1835 
.0887 
.8322 
.0852 
.0825 
.2060 
.1779 
.2522 
.1940 
.1696 
.3553 
.5799 
.0647 
.5090 
.7944 
.5981 
.6716 
.1548 
.2982 
.2505 
.2218 
.2391 
.2884 
.0691 
.1028 
.1152 
.1048 
.1194 
.1333 
.1466 
.1184 
.0900 
.4410 
.2994 
.2591 
.4403 
.2468 
.1530 
.0925 
.0672 
To employrnent To inactivity 
Coeff. I t I Coeff. Itl 
-.3027 
-.1393 
1. 78 
1.84 
-3.3150 
1.455 
8.11 
1.67 
-.0045 
-.0608 
.0343 
-.3436 
.2555 
.1036 
.0181 
-.1615 
-.0653 
-.1878 
-.3118 
-.0862 
.0297 
.1312 
-.0268 
-.0709 
-.1773 
-.0057 
.3323 
.0056 
-.0213 
.1531 
-.1463 
.3527 
.1159 
.0181 
.0407 
-.1309 
-.0145 
.0130 
-.0352 
-.1266 
-.4289 
-.3870 
-.2412 
-.2186 
-.1792 
-.2743 
0.08 
1.13 
0.45 
1.98 
3.85 
0.50 
0.20 
2.21 
0.87 
2.32 
2.97 
0.95 
0.30 
1.48 
0.35 
0.89 
1. 97 
0.10 
3.42 
0.10 
0.29 
1. 80 
1.57 
5.19 
2.10 
0.26 
0.59 
1. 93 
0.12 
0.11 
0.31 
1.12 
3.77 
3.46 
2.10 
1. 79 
3.18 
4.54 
-.1920 3.28 
-.1438 2.06 
-.6900 7.22 
-.8657 7.46 
.288 
-6,724 
4,055 
9,208 
-.4418 
.0745 
- .1138 
.4201 
-.1285 
-.2402 
-.0995 
-.2220 
.1133 
-.0090 
-.3623 
.0404 
.0483 
.1960 
-.4086 
.1823 
-.2085 
-.0174 
.4609 
.1833 
.0274 
.1040 
-.1693 
.1199 
-.0589 
.0698 
.1378 
-.0218 
.1809 
.3780 
.3157 
.6691 
.5484 
.3330 
.9770 
.7003 
-.1228 
- .1109 
2.86 
0.63 
0.60 
1.12 
0.62 
0.48 
0.47 
1.34 
0.70 
0.05 
1. 30 
0.19 
0.22 
0.99 
2.27 
1.13 
1. 01 
0.13 
2.58 
1. 58 
0.16 
0.55 
0.81 
0.76 
0.47 
0.44 
0.89 
0.14 
0.60 
1.32 
1.06 
2.43 
2.00 
1.20 
3.60 
2.38 
0.97 
0.82 
-.2624 1. 90 
.1242 0.84 
-.2717 1.38 
-.2795 1.22 
.044 
Note: The sample is composed of unemployed men aged 16-29. See text for 
details on criteria for sample selection. 
Source: Matched EPA files, second quarter of 1987 to fourth quarter of 1996. 
Table 4. Determinants of Transitions from Unemployment to Employment and 
to Inactivity. Multinomial Logit Estimates and Asimptotic t-Statistics. 
Women 
Sample 
proportions 
Constant 
Aged 16-19 
Aged 20-24 
Aged 25-29 
Primary education or les s 
Secondary {academic} 
Secondary {vo~ational} 
University 
Married 
Previous job characteristics 
Self-employment 
wage/salary {Public} 
Wage/salary {Private} 
Tenure 0-2 months 
3-5 
6-11 
12-35 
36+ 
Lost a temporary job 
Layed-off 
Other 
Farming/fishing 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade/hotel 
Other services 
Job search related variables 
Receiving benefits 
Registered without benefits 
Not registered 
willing to change residency 
Willing to change activity 
Willing to accept lower wage 
willing to accept lower category 
Look for full-time job only 
Part-time job acceptable 
Seasonal and yearly variables 
First quarter 
Second quarter 
Third quarter 
Fourth quarter 
Year 1987 
Year 1988 
Year 1989 
Year 1990 
Year 1991 
Year 1992 
Year 1993 
Year 1994 
Year 1995 
Unemployrnent duration dummies 
Unemployed 1 month or les s 
Unemployed 2 months 
Unemployed 3 months 
Quarter 1 
Quarter 2 
Quarter 3 
Quarter 4 
Quarter 5 
Proportion of cases 
Log likelihood 
Number of individuals 
Number of quarterly spells 
.2099 
.4382 
.3518 
.2339 
.5322 
.1642 
.0695 ' 
.2524 
.0200 
.1333 
.8465 
.2754 
.2132 
.2207 
.1797 
.1108 
.8109 
.0742 
.1147 
.1338 
.2055 
.0150 
.3093 
.3361 
.3178 
.6091 
.0729 
.3007 
.7484 
.5506 
.6111 
.1268 
.3391 
.2558 
.2117 
.2643 
.2680 
.0582 
.0937 
.1131 
.1283 
.1289 
.1172 
.1691 
.1120 
.0791 
.4464 
.3028 
.2506 
.3949 
.2509 
.1621 
.1111 
.0808 
To employment 
Coeff. Itl 
- .4221 1. 81 
.0124 0.14 
-.1327 1.64 
-.0456 0.53 
.2296 2.40 
.4887 3.59 
-.3057 3.37 
-.4233 1.35 
-.0209 0.17 
- .1177 1. 22 
-.1571 1.61 
-.3100 2.81 
-.3215 2.31 
-.1432 1.03 
-.1083 0.90 
.0724 0.56 
-1.3038 2.74 
-.0166 0.17 
-.1133 1.08 
-.1187 1.49 
.4884 4.09 
.0707 0.95 
-.0879 0.94 
-.0156 0.13 
.0394 0.32 
.1633 1. 61 
-.0042 0.05 
-.0373 0.38 
-.1400 1.51 
- .0971 1.03 
-.1627 1.01 
-.0950 0.61 
-.3715 2.35 
-.4550 2.83 
-.4448 2.72 
-.6640 4.24 
-.4224 2.60 
-.2978 1.71 
- .0954 1. 22 
-.0888 1.08 
-.0022 0.02 
-.0464 0.49 
-.3166 2.71 
-.7772 5.06 
.204 
To inactivity 
Coeff. I t I 
-3.0238 7.26 
.1639 1. 01 
-4,245 
2,419 
6,125 
.0574 0.43 
-.1130 0.83 
-.3502 1.95 
-.2250 0.85 
.9722 7.54 
-.0987 0.24 
-.1066 0.52 
.0575 0.34 
-.0114 0.06 
-.4018 1.99 
.1042 0.48 
.2626 1. 24 
.4313 2.38 
.7113 3.40 
.6181 1. 65 
.2698 1. 61 
-.1164 0.62 
-.1383 1.07 
.4137 2.10 
.1445 1.12 
-.1578 1.02 
-.1492 0.78 
.1856 0.92 
.1538 0.90 
.0793 0.65 
.1200 0.71 
.1692 1. 06 
.3360 2.16 
-.3805 1.18 
-.0290 0.10 
-.1850 0.65 
.4378 1.61 
.6409 2.39 
.0952 0.35 
.1480 0.51 
.1407 0.44 
-.0322 0.25 
-.0546 0.39 
-.2734 1.95 
- .3221 1. 93 
-.2076 1.11 
-.3588 1.64 
.062 
Note: The sample is composed of unemployed women aged 16-29. See text for 
details on criteria for sample selection. 
Source: Matched EPA files, second quarter of 1987 to fourth quarter of 1996. 
Table 5. Predicted Hazard Rates for Men 
Quarters 
1 =>2 2=>3 3 =>4 4=>5 5=>6 
1.- FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO EMPLOYMENT 
Reference Group 41. 62 37.23 38.06 26.50 23.23 
Aged 16-19 35.74 32.14 32.12 22.37 19.48 
University education 33.17 29.31 29.92 20.14 17.46 
Married 48.03 43.45 44.36 31.84 28.15 
Previous job tenure = 12-35 months 37.15 32.96 33.75 23.01 20.05 
Not registered at INEM 49.34 44.87 45.58 33.10 29.34 
Willing to accept a lower wage job 45.29 40.80 41.63 29.53 26.01 
Search for a full-time job only 50.25 45.68 46.53 33.83 30.02 
Year 1992 31.16 27.47 28.00 18.72 16.19 
Year 1995 35.62 31.69 32.19 22.00 19.14 
2.- FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO INACTIVITY 
Reference Group 2.05 1. 71 2.45 1. 98 2.05 
Aged 16-19 8.66 7.26 10.18 8.24 8.48 
University education 3.50 2.88 4.13 3.23 3.31 
Married 1. 61 1.36 1. 94 1.62 1. 69 
Previous job tenure = 12-35 months 2.18 1. 81 2.60 2.06 2.12 
Not registered at INEM 2.76 2.34 3.33 2.81 2.95 
willing to accept a lower wage job 2.12 1. 78 2.55 2.10 2.19 
Search for a full-time job only 1.96 1. 66 2.37 2.00 2.10 
Year 1992 4.07 3.35 4.79 3.72 3.80 
Year 1995 4.39 3.64 5.19 4.12 4.24 
Source: Calculated from estimation results shown in Table 3. 
Table 6. Predicted Hazard Rates for Women 
Quarters 
1 =>2 2=>3 3 =>4 4=>5 5=>6 
1.- FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO EMPLOYMENT 
Reference m:oup 38.47 38.68 37.68 31. 49 22.57 
Aged 16-l9 38.57 38.83 37.83 31.61 22.68 
University education 50.71 50.88 49.81 43.02 32.36 
Married 29.97 30.50 29.66 24.16 16.92 
Previous job tenure = 12-35 months 31.77 31.89 30.96 25.45 17.77 
Not registered at INEM 49.88 50.24 49.20 42.35 31.84 
willing to accept a lower wage job 38.25 38.43 37.42 31. 26 22.38 
Search for a full-time job only 42.22 42.48 41. 45 34.97 25.45 
Year 1992 27.78 28.15 27.32 22.17 15.36 
Year 1995 31.55 31.78 30.87 25.33 17.72 
2.- FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO INACTIVITY 
Reference Group 2.85 2.19 2.12 2.60 2.54 
Aged 16-l9 3.33 2.55 2.48 3.04 2.97 
University education 1. 84 1. 41 1. 37 1. 74 1. 79 
Married 7.98 6.19 5.99 7.17 6.84 
Previous job tenure = 12-35 months 2.15 1. 64 1. 59 1.92 1. 83 
Not registered at INEM 3.43 2.64 2.57 3.25 3.33 
willing to accept a lower wage job 2.48 1. 90 1. 84 2.26 2.21 
Search for a full-time job only 3.10 2.38 2.31 2.86 2.84 
Year 1992 6.10 4.71 4.55 5.43 5.13 
Year 1995 3.63 2.79 2.69 3.25 3.10 
Source: Calculated from estimation results shown in Table 4. 
Table 7. The Effect of the Business Cycle on Young Workers' 
Transitions From Unemployrnent 
Coeff. 
t 
Men 
To Emp. To Inact. 
.082 
7.3 
-.021 
-0.9 
Women 
To Emp. To Inact. 
.090 
5.6 
-.072 
-2.8 
".". ". ".", 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Predicted transition rates by quarters 
6. GDP = O 9.-o 
1-> 2 31. 83 4.10 25.03 5.01 
2-> 3 28.30 3.34 25.42 3.79 
3-> 4 28.95 4.80 24.74 3.62 
4-> 5 19.54 3.74 20.01 4.22 
5-> 6 16.98 3.83 13.67 4.00 
6. GDP 4 % 
1-> 2 39.48 3.36 32.78 3.42 
2-> 3 35.52 2.77 33.14 2.58 
3-> 4 36.30 3.98 32.33 2.46 
4-> 5 25.32 3.21 26.69 2.94 
5-> 6 22.21 3.31 18.70 2.85 
Note: The reported coefficients correspond to those obtained for 
the GDP growth, defined as the rate of change in each quarter 
over the same quarter ayear earlier. The model specification for 
results shown in Tables 3 and 4 was used, where the year dummies 
have been replaced wi th the GDP growth as a measure of the 
business cycle. The reference group for calculating the predicted 
transition rates has the same characteristics than those 
indicated in note 11. 
Source: Matched EPA files, second quarter of 1987 to fourth 
quarter of 1994. 
Table Al. Percentage of Experienced Job Seekers and Unemployment Rate 
by Age Groups and Gender, 1987-1996 
1. Men 
Proportion of Experienced Young Workers Unemployrnent Rate 
16-19 20-24 25-29 16-19 20-24 25-29 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
2. Women 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
27.9 
31.9 
37.9 
46.9 
49.7 
48.2 
53.6 
41.4 
40.4 
40.8 
20.0 
29.9 
32.0 
34.8 
41.0 
43.4 
44.4 
39.4 
34.1 
32.2 
53.8 
54.4 
56.7 
63.0 
66.5 
73.7 
78.2 
73 .8 
67.9 
66.4 
39.4 
40.2 
43.9 
51. 7 
57.1 
62.0 
64.4 
60.1 
56.0 
56.2 
75.9 
76.6 
75.8 
77 .3 
80.6 
84.9 
86.1 
86.0 
81. 9 
81. 6 
57.8 
58.9 
61.3 
65.7 
65.4 
69.6 
73.6 
73.8 
71. 7 
70.3 
Source: EPA's second quarter of each year. 
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Figure 1. Predicted Transitions Rates 
Source: Calculated from estimation results shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
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Figure Al. Unemployment Rates ofYoung Workers and Relative Unemployment Rates According to 
the Labour Force Survey (EPA), 1977-1996 
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